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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Richard Garza Pena appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm,
driving without privileges, possession of paraphernalia, and possession of a
controlled substance (testosterone). Pena contends the district court erred in
one of its evidentiary rulings.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Officer Jose DelRio conducted a traffic stop on Pena’s car after he
observed Pena commit a driving infraction. (Trial Tr., p.182, L.21 – p.184, L.15.)
Upon approaching Pena’s car, Officer DelRio saw the driver, later identified as
Pena, making furtive movements. (Trial Tr., p.185, Ls.2-17, p.187, Ls.23-25.)
When Officer DelRio made contact with Pena, Pena was nervous and had
difficulty producing the paperwork Officer DelRio requested. (Trial Tr., p.186,
Ls.2-24.)

After checking Pena’s information through dispatch, Officer DelRio

learned Pena’s driver’s license was suspended and that Pena had an
outstanding warrant for his arrest. (Trial Tr., p.190, L.10 – p.191, L.1.) Officer
DelRio arrested Pena and, because Officer DelRio suspected Pena was under
the influence, field sobriety and other drug evaluation tests were performed at the
jail, including a blood draw conducted pursuant to a warrant. (Trial Tr., p.197, L.9
– p.198, L.23, p.224, L.20 – p.234, L.23, p.248, L.9 – p.254, L.19, p.267, L.14 –
p.269, L.17, p.288, Ls.3-10.)

The results of Pena’s blood test revealed the
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presence of methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.301, L.20 – p.302, L.10, p.304, L.25
– p.305, L.2.)
Following Pena’s arrest, law enforcement conducted an inventory search
of Pena’s car because Pena said he wanted to have his car towed and, in any
event, the applicable police department policy required Pena’s car to be towed
and inventoried when an individual is arrested for driving under the influence.
(Trial Tr., p.163, Ls.13-19, p.200, Ls.3-14, p.311, Ls.2-23.) The inventory search
of Pena’s car uncovered a loaded, modified shotgun between the driver’s seat
and center console, additional shells for the gun inside a “traveling soap case,” a
metal spoon with residue and a syringe inside the center console, and a wooden
box in the back of the car that contained additional syringes and testosterone.
(Trial Tr., p.311, L.24 – p.323, L.25, p.401, L.1 – p.402, L.7; Exhibits 8, 10, 12,
18, 19, 20, 23.)
The state charged Pena with unlawful possession of a firearm, driving
under the influence, driving without privileges, possession of drug paraphernalia,
and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (testosterone).

(R.,

pp.22-24, 29-31.) The state also filed an Information Part II alleging Pena is a
persistent violator. (R., pp.64-66.)
Prior to trial, Pena stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction, which
would make it unlawful for him to possess a firearm, and the court instructed the
jury accordingly. (Trial Tr., p.17, L.6 – p.19, L.25, p.379, Ls.10-17; R., p.170.)
The jury found Pena guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, driving without
privileges, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a controlled
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substance, but acquitted him of driving under the influence. (R., pp.190-191.)
After the jury’s verdict, Pena pled guilty to the persistent violator allegation.
(2/20/2015 Tr., p.50, L.14 – p.56, L.4.) The court imposed a unified 20-year
sentence, with seven years fixed, on the unlawful possession of a firearm charge,
and concurrent 182-day sentences on the three misdemeanors, with credit for
182 days served. (R., pp.194-197.) Pena filed a timely notice of appeal. (R.,
pp.202-204.)

3

ISSUE
Pena states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred by determining the evidence of Mr.
Pena’s prior encounters with police was admissible propensity
evidence.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Pena failed to show the district court erred in its ruling allowing noncharacter evidence that Pena had been seen driving his car on prior, recent
occasions to rebut Pena’s defense that he did not know there was a loaded,
modified shotgun hidden in his car between the driver’s seat and console?
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ARGUMENT
Pena Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Ruling Regarding The
Admissibility Of The Non-Character Evidence That Pena Had Been Seen Driving
His Car On Prior, Recent Occasions
A.

Introduction
Pena contends the district court erred in admitting testimony from officers

“about having previously encountered Mr. Pena while he was driving th[e] same
vehicle” he was driving when he was stopped in this case. (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.7-8.)

Pena contends the evidence “was not relevant to a material and

disputed non-propensity basis” and was, therefore, “inadmissible under I.R.E.
404(b).” (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.) Pena also argues that, even if “relevant to a
non-propensity purpose, the prejudice presented by that testimony substantially
outweighed its minimal probative value,” such that the evidence should have
been excluded. (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.) Pena’s arguments fail. Application of
the correct legal standards to the facts shows the district court did not err in
admitting evidence that Pena had been seen driving his car on prior, recent
occasions because such evidence does not run afoul of I.R.E. 404(b) since it did
not bear on Pena’s character.

Moreover, the evidence was not unfairly

prejudicial.
B.

Standard Of Review
Relevance is a question of law reviewed de novo, while balancing under

I.R.E. 403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,
190, 254 P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011). Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are also
reviewed under a bifurcated standard: whether the evidence is admissible for a
5

purpose other than propensity is given free review while the determination of
whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009). In reviewing a trial court’s
discretionary decision, this Court evaluates whether the trial court correctly
perceived the decision as discretionary, whether the trial court acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistent with legal standards, and whether the
court exercised reason in making its decision. Norton, 151 Idaho at 190, 254
P.3d at 91.
C.

Pena Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Ruling That NonCharacter Evidence That Pena Had Been Seen Driving His Car On Prior,
Recent Occasions Was Relevant To His Knowledge Of And/Or Control
Over The Gun Found In His Car
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence

that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has
any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be
without the evidence, is relevant. State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d
807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989). “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove a defendant’s criminal propensity. However, such evidence
may be admissible for a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b).”
State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations
omitted). Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may be admitted
to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178,
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845 P.2d 1211 (1993). In Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court set forth a two-tiered
analysis to determine the admissibility of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b). State v.
Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 138, 267 P.3d 721, 725 (Ct. App. 2011). “The first tier
involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to establish
the prior bad acts as fact; and (2) whether the prior bad acts are relevant to a
material disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity.” Id.
(citing Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188).
The second step in a 404(b) analysis involves a determination of whether
the evidence, although relevant, should be excluded because the danger of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. Sheahan,
139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003). Pursuant to I.R.E. 403,
relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the district court’s discretion, the danger
of unfair prejudice -- which is the tendency to suggest a decision on an improper
basis -- substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. State v.
Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho
651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651,
656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1993). As previously explained by the Idaho
Supreme Court: “Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rule
suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence.” State v.
Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in
original). Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely
prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party’s case. See State v.
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Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) (“Certainly that evidence
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is
demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in
prejudice to a defendant.”). Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that
is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an
improper basis. Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908. As long as the
evidence is relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant’s character
and its probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by
the probability of unfair prejudice, it is not error to admit it. State v. Cross, 132
Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999).
In her opening statement, defense counsel argued that Pena did not know
the loaded, modified shotgun was in his car because “his car gets a lot of traffic;
passengers, people borrowing it,” and that is “very typical” for Pena. (Trial Tr.,
p.149, L.23 – p.150, L.6, p.152, Ls.5-13.)

Defense counsel concluded her

opening by telling the jury:
. . . [T]he state has to show what [Pena] knew, they have to
show he knew the gun was there or that he had the intent to
possess and control it. The issue for you to decide today is not was
this [Pena’s] car. It was his car. The issue for you to decide is not
were some of the things in the car his, of course they were, his
things were in his car. He doesn’t dispute that. The issue for you
to decide is what did he know and what did he control. And he will
tell you he did not know the gun was there and it was not his.
And so at the end of the trial, we’re going to ask that you find
[Pena] not guilty because the state cannot prove to you beyond a
reasonable doubt what he knew or what he could control.
(Trial Tr., p.156, L.13 – p.157, L.2.)
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After opening statements, but before the state called its first witness, the
court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury regarding the admissibility
of certain evidence, which included the state’s request to elicit testimony from
two officers who had seen Pena in the same car prior to the date of his arrest in
this case. (Trial Tr., p.170, L.24 – p.172, L.20.) The prosecutor indicated she did
not intend to inquire about the nature of the prior contact, but only the fact that
the officers had seen Pena driving his car in order to respond to the defense
outlined in Pena’s opening statement that he was unaware of the gun in his car
because “he’s loaning it out.” (Trial Tr., p.171, Ls.5-13.) Pena objected because
he did not deny that it was his car and because, he asserted, it was “an improper
comment on 404(b).” (Trial Tr., p.171, Ls.14-18.)
In response to the court’s inquiry asking “[h]ow far in advance of this date
had these two officers interacted with [Pena],” Pena responded, “[o]ne month,”
and the prosecutor answered, “[w]ithin the last one or two months.” (Trial Tr.,
p.171, L.21 – p.172, L.3.) The court ruled:
I think that probably is fair given what has been at least
argued to the jury at this point, and I think it’s evidence of not only
his ownership, which may not be in dispute, but his use of the
vehicle, and therefore his potential control of anything in the
vehicle. Sounds like if it’s a month or so before, it’s close enough in
time to make it relevant. I’ll instruct you to be careful about that,
their discussion what in particular -- why they had that contact.
(Trial Tr., p.172, Ls.12-20.)
Consistent with the court’s ruling, the prosecutor’s inquiry of the two
officers was limited. Officer Dan Muguira, who responded to the scene shortly
after Officer DelRio stopped Pena, testified that he had seen Pena in that same
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car before on “three different occasions in about two-and-a-half, three months
prior to that traffic stop.”

(Trial Tr., p.307, Ls.1-16.)

Officer Tad Miller also

testified that he had previously seen Pena in his vehicle “[a]approximately three
times” over the six to eight month period preceding Pena’s arrest. (Trial Tr.,
p.347, Ls.2-14.)
Pena argues that Officers Muguira’s and Miller’s testimony that they had
seen Pena in his car on several occasions in the months prior to his arrest in this
case was impermissible I.R.E. 404(b) evidence because, he contends, the
evidence “was not relevant to a material and disputed issue” since Pena did not
dispute he owned the car.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)

Pena’s argument fails

because it reflects a misunderstanding of the law and the facts. Although “Rule
404(b) is not limited to ‘bad’ acts,” but “encompasses ‘other crimes, wrongs, or
acts,’” “evidence runs afoul of Rule 404(b) only if its purpose is to ‘prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith.’” State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254 P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011)
(quoting I.R.E. 404(b)). “Therefore, evidence is inadmissible where its purpose is
to demonstrate a propensity to commit other crimes, wrongs, or acts.” Norton,
151 Idaho at 190, 254 P.3d at 91. Conversely, if the evidence does not bear on
the defendant’s character, it is not subject to I.R.E. 404(b). Id.
The fact that Pena had been seen driving his car on other occasions does
not bear on Pena’s character. As such, it is not subject to analysis under I.R.E.
404(b). Norton, 151 Idaho at 190, 254 P.3d at 91. Moreover, notwithstanding
Pena’s claim to the contrary, the evidence was relevant to a material and
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disputed issue, which was not whether Pena owned the car where the gun was
found, but whether he knowingly possessed and/or had custody or control of the
gun hidden in his car. (See R., p.168 (Instruction No. 14).) Evidence that Pena
was regularly seen driving his car in the weeks and months leading up to his
arrest was relevant to prove knowledge and/or control, and was appropriate to
rebut Pena’s defense that he did not know there was a loaded, modified shotgun
between his driver’s seat and his console.
Pena alternatively argues that, even if relevant, the evidence was unfairly
prejudicial because, according to Pena, it had “minimal probative value” since it
was “cumulative” to evidence that he owned the car and cumulative to evidence
that he also used the car. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-10.) Pena further argues that
the “risk of undue prejudice” was high. (Appellant’s Brief, p.10.) Like Pena’s
relevance argument, these arguments also fail.
Pena’s claim that the evidence was cumulative because there was no
dispute that he owned the car, again, misses the point. As noted by the district
court, the evidence was relevant to what Pena knew and what he controlled in
relation to the contents of his car, not to whether he owned the car. (Trial Tr.,
p.172, Ls.12-20.) Pena’s second argument, that the evidence was cumulative to
other evidence that he used the car, is based on the fact that he “was driving the
car when it was pulled over, which demonstrates he uses the car,” and based on
his own testimony that “he used it regularly.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.10.) Offering
evidence that Pena was recently seen driving the car on occasions other than
“when it was pulled over” is not cumulative. The entire point of the evidence is to

11

demonstrate that Pena was driving the car on other separate and recent
occasions and, therefore, had knowledge of and control over its contents; the
point was not to show cumulative evidence that he was driving on the night he
was arrested.
Moreover, the state was entitled to present evidence in its case in chief to
establish Pena’s knowledge and control without waiting for Pena to testify that he
regularly drove his own car. If anything, Pena’s testimony that he drove his car
“almost every day” (Trial Tr., p.527, Ls.20-21), undermines his assertion that he
was unfairly prejudiced by other evidence that corroborated his claim.
Even if the Court agrees with Pena’s argument that the evidence was
cumulative, which is a “consideration” under I.R.E. 403, that does not make the
evidence unfairly prejudicial.

Indeed, unfair prejudice is an entirely separate

consideration under the rule that may justify exclusion. I.R.E. 403. And, notably,
Pena never advanced a “cumulative” argument to the district court or, for that
matter, an argument that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. Rather, Pena’s
only argument was that it was an “improper comment on 404(b).” (Trial Tr.,
p.171, Ls.17-18.)

Thus, to the extent Pena’s appellate claims were not

preserved, this Court should decline to consider them. State v. Stevens, 115
Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (“an objection on one ground
will not be deemed sufficient to preserve for appeal all objections that could have
been raised”).
Pena’s reliance on United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d 72 (2nd Cir. 2012), in
support of his unfair prejudice claim is unpersuasive. (Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)
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Pena contends that the Second Circuit has “[c]onveniently” “engaged in an indepth evaluation of this question in regard to similar testimony.” (Appellant’s
Brief, p.10.) In Scott, the defendant was charged with distributing a controlled
substance and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. 677
F.3d at 74.

At trial, the government introduced evidence that the arresting

detectives knew Scott from prior interactions and, therefore, recognized him
when they observed the alleged drug buy that formed the basis of the charges in
the pending case. Id. The specific challenged testimony of the detectives was
that they had talked with Scott on several occasions. Id. at 76. The Second
Circuit concluded such testimony was inadmissible under F.R.E. 404(b) because
it “would certainly bear adversely on the jury’s judgement of [Scott’s] character.”
Id. at 78 (quotations and citation omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the court
distinguished between “a police officer’s mere observations of a defendant in an
area and testimony that the two different detectives had had occasion to speak to
him up to five times and for up to twenty minutes (and on at least some different
occasions).” Id. The court characterized this difference as “substantial,” and it
was this difference that made the act subject to F.R.E. 404(b).

Id.

Pena

“conveniently” ignores this “substantial” distinction in his reliance on Scott even
though the distinction directly applies to the facts of this case.
Pena has failed to show any error in the admission of non-character
evidence that he had been seen driving his car on prior, recent occasions.
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D.

Even If This Court Concludes Pena Has Met His Burden Of Showing
Evidentiary Error, Any Such Error Is Harmless
Even if this Court concludes that any of the challenged evidence should

have been excluded, the error is harmless. Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that
“[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded.”

I.C.R. 52.

“The inquiry is whether, beyond a

reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even
without the admission of the challenged evidence.” State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho
664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)); see also State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
At trial, Pena admitted his license was suspended, admitted that the
needles and the testosterone found in his car belonged to him, and admitted that
he used the needles to inject testosterone and methamphetamine. (Trial Tr.,
p.512, Ls.9-18, p.533, Ls.7-25.) Pena also stipulated that he had previously
been convicted of a felony, which would prohibit him from possessing a firearm.
(R., p.170.) Thus, with respect to the charges for which Pena was convicted, the
only element Pena contested was whether he knowingly possessed and/or had
custody or control of the loaded, modified shotgun hidden between his driver’s
seat and the center console.1 (Trial Tr., p.534, Ls.8-13; see R., pp.168, 170.) As
such, any error in the admission of testimony that two officers had previously
seen Pena driving his car is harmless as to Pena’s convictions for driving without
1

In his statement of facts, Pena acknowledges his admission “that he knew his
license was suspended,” but does not acknowledge his admission to possessing
paraphernalia or testosterone. (Appellant’s Brief, p.5 n.3.)
14

privileges, possession of paraphernalia, and possession of a controlled
substance. The testimony was also harmless in relation to Pena’s conviction for
unlawful possession of a firearm.
The evidence that Pena had knowledge of and/or control over the loaded,
modified shotgun included its location between the driver’s seat, where Pena was
sitting, and the console, and that the gun was positioned in a manner to be
readily accessible to the driver. (Trial Tr., p.312, L.1 – p.313, L.12.) There was
also evidence that Pena had a “traveling soap case,” that contained additional
ammunition for the gun, located in front of the console. (Trial Tr., p.316, L.18 –
p.318, L.3.) Pena’s claim at trial that he was unaware of the gun was based on
his testimony that he often loaned out his car, but he was unclear about the
precise times he did that, and even though he checked his car after people
borrowed it, he never found the gun right next to the driver’s seat. (Trial Tr.,
p.528, L.14 – p.531, L.3, p.534, Ls.1-7, p.572, L.25 – p.574, L.24.) Pena also
testified that, on the night of his arrest, after he went to a bar to pick up two girls
and give them a ride home, he stopped at a house at one of the girls’ request.
(Trial Tr., p.507, L.13 – p.511, L.4.) According to Pena, while at that house, he
allowed one of his passengers to load a duffle bag and “stuff” into his car, but he
was unsure where she put it. (Trial Tr., p.510, L.21 – p.511, L.4, p.559, Ls.4-19.)
This testimony was severely undermined by Pena’s two passengers, who both
denied stopping anywhere between when Pena picked them up at the bar and
when they were pulled over, and denied leaving anything in Pena’s car. (Trial
Tr., p.382, L.7 – p.383, L.3, p.386, L.18 – p.388, L.20.)
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While relevant, the testimony that Officers Muguira and Miller had, over
the weeks to months prior to Pena’s arrest, seen him driving his car was not
necessary to Pena’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm. At worst,
that evidence would only be prejudicial to the extent it implied Pena had prior
criminal contacts with law enforcement. However, such evidence was explicitly
before the jury by virtue of the warrant that served as the basis for Pena’s arrest,
the fact that he had an invalid license, and his stipulation to being a felon.
Moreover, Pena admitted to criminal behavior by using methamphetamine.
Indeed, Pena’s methamphetamine use, his invalid license, and his outstanding
arrest warrant were introduced to the jury at the outset through Pena’s opening
statement.

(Trial Tr., p.151, Ls.2-3 (“He will tell you that he has a

methamphetamine addiction.”); p.153, Ls.3-6 (Pena “will tell you I was nervous, I
knew I had a warrant for my arrest, and I knew that I didn’t have a driver’s
license, and I didn’t want to go to jail.”).) This Court can easily conclude, “beyond
a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [Pena] even without the
admission of the challenged evidence.” Johnson, supra.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Pena guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm,
driving without privileges, possession of paraphernalia, and possession of a
controlled substance.
DATED this 17th day of May, 2016.
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